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Backing Up the Bus: Can We Ever Retreat from 
Desegregation? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1954, the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of 
Education and started the states rolling on the long and 
torturous road to school desegregation. 1 The Brown Court has 
been widely praised for striking down the fifty-eight year reign 
of the "separate but equal" doctrine which the Court had 
authored in Plessy v. Ferguson. 2 However, the analysis the 
Court applied in Brown, and especially the implementation 
decision, left much to be desired.3 After hearing argument on 
the Brown case for the third time,4 the Court's only guidance on 
how to desegregate the schools was to act reasonably and 
"organize public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis 
with all deliberate speed ... "5 Such minimal guidance from the 
Supreme Court has resulted in a confusing and uncertain 
approach to desegregation in the lower federal and state courts. 
While the Supreme Court has authorized a variety of 
remedies for Equal Protection violations in the school desegrega-
1. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The "separate but equal" doctrine was originally 
applied by the Plessy court in the context of segregated railroad passenger cars, but 
it quickly became the standard by which racial segregation in all contexts, including 
public schools, was measured. In essence, the notion of"separate but equal" is that 
it is not constitutionally impermissible to divide people according to their race so 
long as the facilities provided for the separate races are substantially equal. In 
application, "separate but equal" facilities, especially the public schools, had 
continued to be separate, but rarely were equal. 
3. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). After the 
initial decision by the Supreme Court, striking down the "separate but equal" 
doctrine, the case was remanded to the district court to fashion an appropriate 
remedy. The case retumed to the Supreme Court a year later on the issue of how 
to implement a program of desegregation in the public schools. This decision by the 
Supreme Court is known as the implementation decision. 
4. The implementation decision was, in fact, the third time the case had made 
it to the Supreme Court. When the case first reached the Court they remanded for 
additional fact finding without making a decision. It was the second time that the 
case was before the Court that the famous decision, striking down Plessy v. 
Ferguson, was made. The third time the case came before the Court was to decide 
the issue of implementation as discussed above. 
5. ld. at 301. 
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tion context, the most useful, and most used, tool has been 
busing. The courts first ordered busing in the South where there 
was a history of purposeful and statutory discrimination. Then 
busing orders extended to the North and West where there was 
little or no history of purposeful or statutory discrimination. 
Today, busing has become a familiar fact of life, especially in 
large urban areas. In a few cases, the extent of busing has 
become extreme, requiring bus rides of one hour or more for 
children as young as five and six. 6 
In some instances, busing remedies actually amplify rather 
than alleviate the underlying causes of segregated schools. The 
process typically begins when the courts impose a desegregation 
order on a school district or group of school districts, cutting up 
white, hispanic, asian or black neighborhoods and grouping them 
into units with sections cut from neighborhoods of the other 
races. Often the result is that parents with the economic means, 
usually affluent whites, move to more remote suburbs or enroll 
their children in private schools to avoid busing. Over time the 
diminishing number of white children in the school throws off 
the racial balance and the entire process must be repeated. Each 
time this occurs school boards and courts are forced to extend the 
reach of busing even further to find the proper balance of races. 
As the scope of busing has expanded, local school boards and 
neighborhood organizations have increasingly taken their 
petitions for "neighborhood schools" to the courts in an attempt 
to limit the expansive reach of the busing remedy. The basis for 
such actions is that busing has achieved its purpose and 
outgrown its usefulness. These groups have argued that the 
purpose for busing school children is to eliminate purposeful 
discrimination rather than to achieve precise racial parity in all 
public schools, and that where purposeful discrimination on the 
basis of race has been eliminated busing is no longer necessary. 7 
However, even where the segregation of the races in the schools 
seems no longer to be purposeful, these efforts have met with 
considerable difficulty. 
6. The author is personally familiar with circumstances in the greater Los 
Angeles area where children of all ages, beginning in Kindergarten, are bused from 
a remote, predominately white, suburban area into an inner city school to achieve 
racial balancing. The moming ride through rush hour traffic can be over an hour. 
While this may be one of the more extreme cases, it is certainly not an anomaly. 
7. See e.g., Crawford v. Board of Education, 458 U.S. 527 (1982); Washington 
v. Seattle School Dis. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
~~----
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The following sections discuss two apparently conflicting 
approaches the Supreme Court has taken with respect to anti-
busing efforts at the Congressional and state levels and examine 
how they can be reconciled with each other. 
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF BROWN AND THE BUSING REMEDY 
Early efforts to enforce Brown met with strong resistance in 
the South. The Supreme Court, however, left the enforcement of 
the desegregation requirement primarily to the lower courts and 
the political arena for several years after the Brown implementa-
tion decision in 1955. When the Supreme Court did address the 
issue of enforcing desegregation, it took a firm stance that 
upheld the validity of Brown.8 
The Supreme Court's first major re-entry to school desegrega-
tion occurred thirteen years after Brown in Green v. County 
School Board.9 In Green the Court dealt squarely with the issue 
of whether Equal Protection required only the elimination of 
purposeful segregation or mandated affirmative efforts to 
integrate the public schools. 10 By this time, many Southern 
school districts had adopted "freedom of choice" plans whereby 
students and parents were free to choose which schools within 
the district they would attend. These plans, however, resulted 
in very little movement of blacks into white schools and almost 
no movement of whites into black schools. 11 
The Court's emphasis then shifted from eliminating purpose-
ful discrimination to achieving actual integration. Because the 
"freedom of choice" plans were not achieving the desired level of 
integration, the Court found such plans to be inadequate. In 
Green the Court said, "[t]he burden on a school board today is to 
come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and 
8. Two examples of this are Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), and Griffin 
v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). In Cooper all 
nine Justices reaffirmed the validity of Brown in the face of opposition to 
desegregation by Governor Faubus and the State of Arkansas. In Griffin, the 
county instituted a plan to avoid desegregation whereby all the public schools in the 
county were closed, and white school children were given grants of public funds to 
pay their tuition at all-white private schools. The Court found the legislation 
unconstitutional, reasoning that the only possible reason for the closing of the public 
schools was to ensure that white children would not, under any circumstances, be 
compelled to go to the same schools as black children in the county. 
9. 391 u.s. 430 (1968). 
10. Id. at 432. 
11. Id. at 441. 
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promises realistically to work now. "12 In evaluating the 
effectiveness of "freedom of choice" plans the Court stated: 
Although the general experience under "freedom of choice" to 
date has been such as to indicate its ineffectiveness as a tool of 
desegregation, there may well be instances in which it can 
serve as an effective device . . . [But] if there are reasonably 
available other ways, such for illustration as zoning, promising 
speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial 
school system, "freedom of choice" must be held unaccept-
able.13 
The emphasis in Green on effects rather than purposes laid the 
foundation for the whole-scale integration orders that were to 
flow from the federal courts over the next twenty years. 
The method most often used by the federal and state courts 
to comply with the Supreme Court's mandate was to carve up 
neighborhoods on the basis of race and assign the correct number 
of sections to the various public schools, insuring that the racial 
balance of each school in the system reflected the racial balance 
of the district as a whole. Achieving this kind of balance can 
often require taking sections from widely separated neighbor-
hoods and assigning them to a single school. Such a process 
relies heavily on racial quotas. 
While the Supreme Court has continued to reject the strict 
application of ratios or quotas to school desegregation, it has 
approved of ratios as a starting point for developing an integra-
tion plan.14 The danger inherent in such a position is that by 
starting with quotas, the end result is seldom more than quotas. 15 
Two questions now arise. First, if there really is no legal 
mandate on the state or local level causing the racial imbalance 
12. ld. at 439 (emphasis in original). 
13. Id. at 440-41. 
14. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
15. While some people feel that strict quotas are the only workable solution to 
segregated schools, such an approach looks past the underlying purposes of school 
desegregation. The popular moral that led to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Brown was the belief that it was improper to separate school children based solely 
on their race. Quotas succeed in racially integrating the schools, but they rely on 
the same fallacy which the Brown decision sought to remedy. The school which a 
child will attend is still determined by his race. Ideally, a system of integration 
should not consider race at all. In operation, however, quotas are easy to 
administer and provide results. The problem of balancing results with analytical 
purity is a difficult one and goes beyond just the school desegregation context, 
reaching into all forms of affirmative action. 
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in the schools, and there is no showing of intent on the part of 
the school board to segregate the schools based on race, is 
integration still compelled by the Fourteenth Amendment simply 
on the grounds that different neighborhoods in the school district 
are primarily black or white? And second, after a court order 
requiring integration of a school system through busing is 
entered, when, if ever, is the problem of purposeful segregation 
sufficiently remedied as to allow the removal of federal court 
jurisdiction and a return to neighborhood schools? These 
questions have been posed increasingly over the years as efforts 
to limit the scope of busing have multiplied. 
The remaining sections will examine the efforts of Congress, 
state and local governments and private citizens to curb busing 
in the public school systems. The contention of those who 
support a reduction in busing is that the point of Brown was to 
eliminate the invidious separation of school children on the basis 
ofrace, not to compel precise racial balances in all public schools. 
In many school districts, racial discrimination seems to have 
been largely eradicated, at least on the official government or 
school board level, and the continued busing may be doing more 
harm than good.16 
III. CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO CURB BUSING 
In the wake of extensive busing remedies mandated by the 
federal courts came efforts by Congress to limit busing in public 
schools. Relying on Congressional power in Art. III and§ 5 of 
the 14th Amendment, several acts have been proposed that 
would limit the busing of school children. 
The Education Amendments of 1974 set up a hierarchy of 
remedies for the federal courts to employ in affecting desegrega-
16. It is important to point out here that this position is not accepted by many 
who have analyzed the problem of school desegregation. Paul R. Dimond, in his 
book, BEYOND BUSING: INSIDE THE CHALLENGE TO URBAN SEGREGATION (1985), 
takes an opposing view. He sees the efforts to curb busing in public school districts 
as unwarranted and premature. His focus is on the Supreme Court's continued 
refusal to consider the actions of government institutions (local, state, and federal) 
other than school boards in promoting segregated residential areas through a wide 
variety of discriminatory practices. Dimond contends that government action is 
often behind the problem of racially segregated neighborhoods, and thus, the racial 
imbalance that continues to exist in many schools can't be dismissed as a simple 
function of geography rather than purposeful discrimination. Dimond advocates the 
continued use of busing to integrate the schools and other measures to get at 
government action that purposefully discriminates on the basis of race beyond the 
school boards themselves. 
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tion. 17 Praising the virtue of neighborhood schools, the Act 
limited the use ofbusing by forbidding "the transportation of any 
student to a school other than the school closest or next closest 
to his place of residence."18 Fearing that the Act might not 
withstand constitutional review, however, an important proviso 
was also added, stating that the provisions of the Act were "not 
intended to modify or diminish the authority of the courts of the 
United States to enforce fully the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments."19 This proviso significantly limited any bite that the 
Act might otherwise have had in limiting the extensive busing 
orders that continued to flow from the courts. 
The efforts to use Congressional power to curb busing 
remedies continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In 1981, 
Senator Johnston of Louisiana proposed the Neighborhood School 
Act, which would have allowed busing as a remedy to school 
segregation cases only in very narrowly defined circumstances. 
While the proposal was adopted by the Senate, it met with 
opposition in the House and was never acted upon. 
Many laws and constitutional amendments have been 
proposed in Congress almost annually, especially during the 
Reagan and Bush Administrations, which took a clear anti-
busing stance and sought to restrict federal court power to order 
busing. However, these efforts have proved unsuccessful to date. 
IV. STATE EFFORTS TO CURB BUSING 
In 1982, the Supreme Court decided two cases concerning the 
constitutionality of state efforts to curb mandatory busing 
programs that the states had previously imposed upon them-
selves in order to remedy racial segregation in their schools. The 
state action in Washington u. Seattle School District No. 120 was 
found unconstitutional while the state action in Crawford u. 
Board of Education21 was sustained. The holdings are difficult 
to reconcile with each other, but a closer look at the Court's 
reasoning is insightful into the modern Court's stance on anti-
busing measures. 
17. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1706-18 (1974). 
18. ld. at § 215(a). 
19. ld. at § 203(b). 
20. 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
21. 458 U.S. 527 (1982). 
·---
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A. Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 
The Washington case was appealed to the Supreme Court to 
decide the constitutionality of a state initiative that provided 
that "no school board [shall] directly or indirectly require any 
student to attend a school other than the school which is 
geographically nearest or next nearest the student's place of 
residence [and] which offers the course of study pursued by such 
student."22 This state law was passed in response to a plan by 
the city of Seattle for mandatory busing to eliminate racial 
imbalance in the city's schools. 
The five vote majority opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, 
held that the state initiative was unconstitutional. Blackmun 
concluded that the initiative "must fall because it does not 
attempt to allocate governmental power on the basis of any 
general principle. [Instead, it uses] the racial nature of an issue 
to define the governmental decision-making structure, thus 
imposing substantial and unique burdens on racial minori-
ties."23 The state's argument that the initiative had no racial 
overtones was rejected by Blackmun, who called this an explicit 
use of race. 24 
The Court emphasized that the practical effect of the 
initiative was to reallocate the power over student assignment 
from the local school boards to the state level. This kind of 
reallocation had been held to be unconstitutional in Hunter v. 
Erickson,25 and Blackmun relied heavily on that case. Black-
mun did concede that "the simple repeal or modification of 
desegregation or anti-discrimination laws, without more, never 
has been viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial 
classification."26 But he saw the Washington statute as doing 
something more than a "simple repeal." 
B. Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Education 
In Crawford, Justice Powell, who had written for the dissent 
in Washington, wrote the majority opinion. Here, the Court 
upheld a California constitutional amendment designed to limit 
22. Washington, 458 U.S. at 462. 
23. Id. at 458. 
24. Id. at 470. 
25. 393 u.s. 385 (1969). 
26. Washington, 458 U.S. at 483 (quoting Crawford, 458 U.S. at 539). 
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the power of the state courts under the state constitution to 
order busing remedies. Previously, the state courts had used the 
California constitution to provide even more extensive busing 
remedies than would be required under federal Equal Protection. 
Now the state legislature sought to limit the state courts to only 
those remedies that would be required in the federal system. 
Addressing the same issue as in Washington, Powell 
concluded that the amendment did not employ an explicit racial 
classification or impose a race specific burden on minorities. 27 
Thus, the discriminatory purpose required for an Equal Protec-
tion violation was not present. The benefits of neighborhood 
schools that the amendment sought to confer were available to 
all, regardless of race. This is especially important considering 
that white students were actually a minority in the Los Angeles 
District. Powell concluded that, "the simple repeal or modifica-
tion of desegregation or antidiscrimination laws, without more, 
never has been viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid 
racial classification."28 
C. Distinguishing Washington from Crawford 
Don't these two cases, decided at the same time, have 
opposite holdings? Both cases deal with the efforts of local 
citizens to cut back on extensive busing remedies where it 
appeared that there was no longer any explicit or purposeful 
discrimination on the part of the school boards. Yet one was 
rejected while the other was upheld. On what grounds can they 
be distinguished? 
Blackmun makes an earnest effort to distinguish the two 
cases on the fact that Washington was taking the control over 
student assignment out of its traditional resting place, the local 
school board; but isn't that what happens every time the federal 
courts step in to mandate integration of the schools by busing? 
And wasn't the initiative in Washington designed to set limits on 
the remedies school boards could use for integrating their schools 
rather than taking away their power to assign students to the 
appropriate school? 
The only plausible distinction between the two cases seems 
to be a relatively insignificant one: where the state seeks to cut 
back on the local school boards' efforts to integrate through 
27. Id. at 531. 
28. Id. at 539. 
a 
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extensive busing there is an Equal Protection violation, but 
where the local school boards themselves seek to cut back on the 
busing remedies they have applied in the past there is no 
constitutional violation. Perhaps underlying all of this is the 
Supreme Court's concern that if Crawford, were held to be 
unconstitutional we might have reached a point of no return. 
The desegregation orders were originally implemented to 
eradicate purposeful discrimination. Once the purposeful 
discrimination has been removed, is there still a need for the 
extensive busing of school children to achieve racial balancing? 
If the answer to this question had been "yes" in Crawford it 
would be hard to conceive of any scenario where the answer 
would be "no." 
V. CONCLUSION 
The debate over whether busing continues to serve its 
purpose and whether traditional busing remedies are doing more 
harm than good remains unresolved. The Supreme Court has 
left itself considerable room on the issue in deciding future cases 
that are sure to arise. Depending on whether the Court chooses 
to characterize the facts of any particular case as more analogous 
to Washington or Crawford, future anti-busing efforts could 
make progress or be stymied. There are also several new 
Justices on the Court since the time of the Washington and 
Crawford cases whose stance on this issue is uncertain. 
Another important feature of this continuing debate is likely 
to come to the front in the near future. The new Republican 
majority that swept into Congress in the 1994 elections is likely 
to make some efforts on the legislative front to curb busing. But 
even if such legislation is passed, it will undoubtedly meet with 
constitutional challenges in the courts. While the future of 
busing in America remains uncertain, the debate is likely to 
increase rather than abate in intensity. 
Keith Woodwell 
